C hina's growing military might is sparking debate on its true intentions. According to a controversial report by the RAND Corporation, the Chinese military, despite its rapid buildup under President Xi Jinping, may not be fully prepared for war. The study suggests that the country’s primary motivation behind its military expansion is political control, rather than preparing for international conflicts.
Under Xi's leadership, China has embarked on an ambitious military modernization program, transforming the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from a regional power to a formidable force capable of challenging global giants, including the United States. Analysts have noted that China’s military advancements could potentially put it on par with, or even surpass, the US in certain categories, especially in the defense of its territorial claims.
However, the RAND report, titled “The Chinese Military’s Doubtful Combat Readiness,” raises questions about whether China’s military is genuinely ready for warfare. Timothy Heath, the report's author and a China expert at RAND, argues that the PLA’s modernization efforts are primarily aimed at bolstering the Communist Party’s control over the country, not preparing for a major conflict. Heath points out that the PLA spends a significant portion of its training time on political education, with up to 40% of training sessions dedicated to topics such as party loyalty rather than combat tactics.
Heath also highlights a divided command structure within the PLA, with political commissars overseeing military units. This system, according to Heath, reduces the ability of commanders to respond quickly to evolving situations on the battlefield. “The PLA remains fundamentally focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war,” he writes, adding that China’s military expansion may be more about domestic stability than external conflict.
Despite these concerns, many experts dismiss Heath’s conclusions. Andrew Erickson, a professor at the US Naval War College, believes the PLA is not simply focused on domestic control but is actively preparing for potential military action, particularly in Taiwan. Erickson asserts that Xi’s military reforms reflect a clear commitment to increasing China’s warfighting capabilities, with China investing heavily in both numbers and technology.
China’s military buildup has included advancements in naval power, with the PLA now operating the largest navy in the world, as well as innovations in stealth aircraft and hypersonic weapons. Despite these technological leaps, some analysts question whether China’s arsenal will be effective in a real-world conflict, citing examples such as the war in Ukraine, where advanced weapons have not always guaranteed military success.
The human factor also plays a crucial role in military readiness. As China continues to build its fleet of high-tech warships, experts note that crewing these vessels with well-trained personnel remains a challenge. Warships like the Type 055 destroyer, considered one of the most powerful surface combatants globally, require specialized training for sailors, which could strain China’s resources.
Furthermore, corruption within the senior ranks of the PLA poses another obstacle to China’s military goals. Reports from the Pentagon suggest that an ongoing anticorruption campaign within the Chinese military is impeding Xi’s defense objectives, affecting the overall operational efficiency of the PLA.
While analysts often focus on China’s potential readiness to invade Taiwan, Heath argues that the country’s leaders have not actively prepared the Chinese public for combat. “Chinese leaders have made no speeches glorifying war or advocating for its inevitability,” Heath notes. This absence of war rhetoric could indicate that China’s military buildup is not solely about preparing for a large-scale invasion but rather about maintaining internal control.
Despite these political and personnel challenges, experts such as Collin Koh of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies emphasize that the PLA should not be dismissed as an ineffective force. Koh argues that, while internal issues persist, China’s military capabilities cannot be easily overlooked, especially when considering the PLA’s growing technological advancements and the nation’s strategic ambitions.
In the end, the real question is not whether China is preparing for war but what kind of conflict it is preparing for. As Drew Thompson of the National University of Singapore points out, “Politics being primary means propaganda is more important than the military outcome.” Whether China’s military can successfully achieve its goals without engaging in all-out war remains to be seen, but one thing is clear: the PLA is not a force to be underestimated.
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